|
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
|
Center Articles and Publications Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2006–FY2007 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Volume 4, Number 2, 2006. © Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. Reprinted with permission. Abstract: Since 2001, the United States government has spent substantial resources on preparing the nation against a bioterrorist attack. Earlier articles in this series analyzed the civilian biodefense funding by the federal government from fiscal years 2001 through 2006. This article updates those figures with budgeted amounts for fiscal year 2007, specifically analyzing the budgets and allocations for biodefense at the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of State, and the National Science Foundation. Sections: Federal funding for civilian biodefense increased by $112 million in the President’s FY2007 budget, for a total request of $5.24 billion (Table 1). Excluding BioShield funds made available in FY2004 and FY2005, the FY2007 budget request continues a trend of incremental increases in civilian biodefense funding since FY2001 (Figure 1). The President’s FY2007 budget request includes funding increases for most of the agencies involved in biodefense, with the largest increase being allocated to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for programs such as the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), biodefense research, and countermeasure development. HHS is the chief recipient of the proposed federal biodefense monies, with 82% of the FY2007 proposed funds going to this agency (Figure 2) and 73% of biodefense-related funds since FY2001 (Figure 3). Funding increases also have been requested for the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of State. The most significant decrease in biodefense funding is proposed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a smaller budget cut is proposed for the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Figure 1. Civilian Biodefense Funding by Fiscal Year, FY2001–FY2007 (in $millions)
Figure 2. Proposed Civilian Biodefense Funding by Agency, FY2007 (in $millions)
Figure 3. Cumulative Civilian Biodefense Funding by Agency, FY2001–FY2007 (in $millions)
Methods and Sources Finding accurate and up-to-date sources of information is another challenge. Departmental “Budget in Brief” documents were analyzed when available, but these reports often do not separate out civilian biodefense efforts, or they may include only partial information. Entire agency or departmental budgets also were examined, yet this was not always an effective method, as civilian biodefense expenditures could be contained within broader line items. Ultimately, when further information was deemed necessary, data were acquired by contacting the public affairs and budget offices of every agency listed in the report. This methodology was based on the principle that the numbers from the respective budget offices would be the most accurate and current, as these were the same numbers then assigned to the program offices responsible for executing programs within the agency. It should be noted that budget line items are not necessarily indicative of size or location of programs. Many programs may be consolidated under one line item (such as DHS’s Science & Technology), or a program may have many components (such as BioShield, which is administered by HHS with guidance from DHS). In other cases, work may be done by one department and reimbursed by another: For example, work done by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has been reimbursed by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and the Office of State and Local Preparedness Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness of HHS. A challenge for this and the previous years’ articles1,2 was to distinguish which items should be considered civilian biodefense and which should not. Here, civilian biodefense funding includes programs, research, and administrative costs that prevent or mitigate bioterrorism’s effects on civilians. Federal budgets for programs intended for the general prevention and mitigation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as “chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures” (e.g., some EPA detection items and BioShield), do not distinguish how much of the program is specifically targeted at civilian biodefense, so they were included in their entirety as a practical measure. Multiple application programs (e.g., HHS’s Medical Reserve Corps or DHS’s National Disaster Medical System) that provide a substantial benefit in responding to an incident of civilian bioterrorism were included in their entirety. Physical security upgrades and other infrastructure protection also were included, but it should be noted that these upgrades cover both laboratory and general security (such as office buildings). This overall methodology led to some overestimation of biodefense funding, because it is likely that some of those funds will be spent on non-biodefense programs. Programs that are not specifically directed at bioterror agents (e.g., the National Institute of Health’s nuclear/radiological medical countermeasures or pandemic flu programs) were not included. Also not included were programs that include a small, undefined biological component (such as many of the DHS Preparedness Directorate’s “All Hazards” grants and training), as well as routine surveillance that does not focus specifically on civilian biodefense but may play a role in such detection (such as the Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, which focuses on chemical contamination and natural microbial contamination). The Department of Defense (DoD) has a large base of research in chemical and biological countermeasures for warfighter protection. However, because of the focus on the warfighter and not the civilian, these numbers were excluded from this article. Some products, such as protective gear and detectors, do not have civilian mass market applications, so these DoD programs are not defined as civilian biodefense in this article. Some DoD research has direct civilian benefit, but because the majority of these funds are primarily military in application, these lines were excluded from calculation of total DoD expenditures. Finally, there are two items of importance that should be noted in this year’s update to earlier “Billions for Biodefense” articles.1,2 The first is the absence of DoD data for both FY2006 and FY2007 and the exclusion of DoD numbers from the overall civilian biodefense funding totals (Table 1). The DoD figures were separated from the calculated totals in this edition of “Billions for Biodefense” for the following reasons:
The second major change was the documenting of additional DHS biodefense efforts that were not included in last year’s article. We have revised the totals from last year’s article, and DHS efforts from FY2001–FY2007 (including the President’s budget request) total $6 billion from the data that is available. The President has requested that NIH create a $160 million fund within the Office of the Director for a program devoted to the advanced development of biodefense countermeasures identified as likely targets for potential acquisition by Project BioShield. Funding for this program for FY2007 will be allocated as a subset of the Biodefense Research money request. Although $50 million was included within the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) biodefense research base to fund similar activities in FY2006, it was not designated as a separate fund. This FY2007 advanced countermeasure development fund represents an increase of $110 million for such activities and is the largest increase in HHS biodefense-related funds for FY2007.4 The Strategic National Stockpile is slated to receive a budget increase of $68 million, for a total of $593 million. Of this, $79 million will be used to continue funding a “Federal Mass Casualty Initiative” for the purchase of portable hospital treatment units that are expected to be used to expand hospital surge capacity in a mass casualty emergency such as a bioterrorist attack. This represents an increase of $29 million in FY2007 over the $50 million that was appropriated in FY2006. Finally, CDC has a proposed cut of $31 million, or about 23%, for its Biosurveillance Initiative, which is intended to strengthen surveillance, containment, and outbreak response measures. According to HHS budget documents, this reduction will be partially offset by FY2007 pandemic influenza emergency funds designated to support the Biosurveillance Initiative.4
Figure 4. HHS Proposed Civilian Biodefense Funding, FY2007 (in millions)
Department of Homeland Security The FY2007 budget decrease is primarily due to a onetime emergency supplemental in FY2006 providing additional funds to the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) for deployment during the response to Hurricane Katrina. NDMS was originally appropriated $34 million for FY20066 but received $100 million in additional appropriations through an emergency supplemental,7 signed on September 8, 2005, to provide disaster relief funds for use as authorized by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. The Office of the Chief Medical Officer was created in July 2005 to serve as the department’s chief liaison to other federal agencies in coordinating overall efforts to prevent and respond to a biological terrorist attack.8 Located within the newly restructured Preparedness Directorate, it is proposed to have a budget of $3 million. The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), a program also within the Preparedness Directorate, is intended to augment and improve emergency preparedness systems in order to increase the effectiveness of first responders to a public health emergency.9 It is not funded in the proposed FY2007 budget, resulting in a reduction of $30 million. The President’s past FY2005 and FY2006 budget proposals also failed to request funding for MMRS after the program rated poorly in the Office of Management and Budget’s annual program assessments.10,11 Congressional appropriators disapproved12,13 of the program’s elimination by declaring it a “vital system”12 and subsequently reinstated $30 million to MMRS for each fiscal year.14 The Science and Technology Directorate budget has a proposed reduction of $39 million, or about 10%, as a result of a decrease in funds for biological countermeasures. The Directorate’s FY2007 request of $337 million includes $23 million for planning, designing, and developing a National Bio and Agrodefense Facility to research biological threats caused by human and animal diseases.15 In FY2004, an advanced appropriation of $5.6 billion was awarded to BioShield for use through FY2013, of which $890 million was made available in FY2004 and $2.5 billion was made available in FY2005. The remaining balance of $2.2 billion is to be made available beginning in FY2009.16 As of FY2006, $2.3 billion of the $3.5 billion in total BioShield funds available prior to FY2009 remained unobligated.17 Additionally, a number of line items that could not be tracked in previous “Billions for Biodefense” articles1,2 were updated for this version when data became available. Particular line items also were shifted when compared to previous articles to reflect the restructuring of DHS directorates after the department’s second-stage review in October 2005.
Department of Agriculture Most of the increases stem from an expansion of the department’s food and agricultural monitoring and research activities. Within food defense, the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) is a collaborative effort between the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and HHS to operate a network of laboratories intended to detect and distinguish biological, chemical, and radiological agents in food.18 FERN was provided a budget increase of $16 million, and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) was provided an additional $14 million for Food Defense Research compared to FY2006. Overall, an increase of $30 million is proposed for the Food Defense component of the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is budgeted an increase of $43 million, or about 49%, to a total of $130 million for enhanced surveillance, and the ARS proposes an increase of $24 million for agricultural defense research. Funding for the completed Ames, Iowa, BSL-3 facility was eliminated, for a decrease of $58 million in FY2007. Overall, an increase of $39 million is proposed for the Agricultural Defense component of the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative. |
