“Our greatest concern is that terrorists might acquire biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, either of which could cause mass casualties.”
Mapping the Global Future – Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Jan. 2005

• Biological weapons have the potential to be highly lethal
• There are no technical barriers to a non-state actor developing a biological weapon

– All knowledge and technologies are accessible, inexpensive, dual-use, easily hidden

• Biological weapons have strong appeal as asymmetric weapons

– No need for a “super-power” grade weapon
– Al Qaeda and other non-state groups have clearly expressed interest in them
– Unlike nuclear weapons, pathogens have no “return address,” so little to hold at risk

• The power of biological weapons is linked to the upwards trajectory of global bioscience in 21st century – biological research must proceed, but also must be aware of risks
• The United States does not currently have sufficient medical countermeasures to respond to the majority of biosecurity threats – robust effort & investment required

1. Fund BARDA advanced development activities appropriately

• $1.07B authorized for FY06-08 in PAHPA (PL 109-417)
• Only $99M appropriated to date
• FY08 L-HHS conference report has $149M – Large gap in funding

• There will be future contract and product failures – the nature of drug development
• HHS needs freedom to operate – excess caution has unintended negative consequences

• Vouchers would have limited social/indirect costs – potential for high value to developer
• PRV for tropical diseases in 2007 FDA Act (PL 110-85) – expand to biosecurity threats