Conference organized by:

Center for Biosecurity of UPMC

World Health Organization Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response Office

Conference sponsored by:

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

WHO Activities for Management of Biorisks
Presenter: Brad Kay, M.S., M.P.H., Dr.PH.

slide thumbnails     slide show

Our world is changing -- we have changed the way we live, microbes have evolved, new threats have emerged, and new solutions for dealing with those threats are needed. With this introduction Dr. Kay outlined the workings of the World Health Organization's Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response (CSR), which is charged with strengthening national capacities to prevent and control disease epidemics. He pointed out that deliberately caused epidemics fundamentally transform the context in which the public health response must be delivered, and that biological research with a legitimate scientific purpose may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security. Kay distinguished between biosafety (working safely) and biosecurity (keeping the work safe) and noted that developing countries have few resources for either biosafety or biosecurity. In order to be sustainable, biosecurity measures must be linked to clear advantages.

From a public health standpoint, bioscience facilities are potential sources of harmful biological agents, but the bioscience community is not accustomed to security issues, global standards for professional conduct of science do not exist, nor do global regulatory mechanisms for biological materials.

From an international standpoint, many nations do not have biosecurity legislation, and uncoordinated national standards could lead to inconsistent regulations or weak implementation. Furthermore, uniform standards on which states can base national legislation for biosecurity are nonexistent.

Kay also highlighted problems associated with control of biological agents, including the fact that microbes are naturally occurring and ubiquitous, traditional security measures can be ineffective, minute amounts are significant, travel and trade promote ease and speed of spread, there is no global means to control or monitor distribution, and the origin of an agent can be difficult to trace.

He concluded by asserting that harmonized, comprehensive global norms and standards for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity with biological materials are needed but missing. Furthermore, the development of norms and standards must be broadly inclusive. International organizations can play a significant facilitating role for global cooperation, he said, and the WHO and its technical partners must work together to produce needed guidance on laboratory biosafety/biosecurity issues. Lastly, he pointed out that resources are needed to address fundamental needs and to assist WHO Member States.

- Summary by Eric Toner, M.D.

return to top     next summary