Biosecurity BriefingSubscribe | About | Current Issue | RSS | Archive National Academies’ Report on Boston BSL-4 Laboratory By Gigi Kwik Gronvall, November 30, 2007 On November 29, 2007, the National Academies released Technical Input1 on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) risk analysis for a proposed biocontainment laboratory at Boston University (Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analysis for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University or DSER2). The technical input document was written by a committee of the National Research Council (NRC), the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The committee reviewed the NIH risk analysis at the request of the state of Massachusetts and concluded that the risk analysis for the Boston lab was “not sound and credible;” the state of Massachusetts plans to submit the NRC Committee’s technical report to NIH during the public comment period for the DSER.1 The DSER outlines the risk of locating a high containment (BSL-3 and 4) biological laboratory in rural, suburban, or urban areas in Massachusetts. Four different scenarios were modeled for the release of disease agents including monkeypox virus, Ebola virus, Sabia virus, and Rift Valley fever virus. The DSER concludes that the risk is the same for any location, with the exception of the rural location where, in the event of a release, mosquitos could become vectors for (carriers of) and hoofed animals such as cattle could become a reservoir for Rift Valley fever.2 In its task to evaluate the DSER for technical merit, the NRC Committee was not asked to independently evaluate the risks of the laboratory, and it was not asked to determine whether the proposed laboratory posed a threat to public health. However, the committee found that the DSER risk analysis lacked scientific merit for a number of reasons, including:1 - Agent selection in DSER ‘worst case scenarios’: “The DSER would have been more useful in supporting decision-making had it considered candidate infectious agents that have the potential to lead to large infection rates in an exposed human population.” In addition, the Committee thought that a vector-borne agent with more likely urban reservoirs, such as rodents or insects, should have been selected for modeling.
- Modeling of ‘worst case scenarios’: The modeling in the DSER did not appear to have been appropriately validated by comparison to other disease models, and it did not include a sensitivity analysis to reveal the effect of variations in transmission rates. There was a lack of information in the DSER about the modeling input data, assumptions, and how the model worked, so that the Committee could not determine whether there was a greater risk to public health and safety from the location of the facility in one or another proposed location.
In addition, the Committee found that the DSER did not adequately consider environmental justice issues, such as the health status of the population surrounding the laboratory and the population’s access to medical care and health services. The Boston location for the laboratory has been controversial in part because the proposed site is in a low-income, predominantly minority community. The Committee also criticized the NIH for its communication of risks, noting that statements in the DSER that risks are “negligible” or “vastly overstated” can appear unfounded and dismissive of public concerns.1 In an interview with BU Today about the NRC review, an NIH official said that NIH “appreciates the thoughtful and rigorous scientific review of this draft document by the NRC Committee and will consider their comments along with all others received from the Boston community and elsewhere.”3 References - Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University: A Letter Report. Committee on Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University, National Research Council. National Academies Press. November 29, 2007. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12073.html. Accessed November 30, 2007.
- Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory Boston University. National Institutes of Health. July 2007. http://www.nems.nih.gov/aspects/nat_resources/programs/nepa2.cfm. Accessed November 30, 2007.
- Jahnke A. Scientists Fault Report on NEIDL. BU Today. November 30, 2007. http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=4&id=47873&template=4. Accessed November 30, 2007.
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