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Biosecurity Briefing
HHS Secretary Visits Indonesia, Links U.S. Lab Restrictions to International H5N1 Virus-Sharing Impasse By Brooke Courtney, April 25, 2008 As reported in a CIDRAP News story on April 22, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) stated that Indonesia appears to be linking the restriction of work at a U.S. laboratory in Jakarta with the ongoing international H5N1 virus-sharing impasse.1 While in Indonesia during a ten-day tour of Southeast Asia, HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt “met with government officials to address virus-sharing issues and Indonesia’s recent move to restrict the work of U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2),” a World Health Organization (WHO) collaborating laboratory that has played a key role in tracking pathogens in Indonesia and was central to the country’s early efforts to track H5N1.1,2 The Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, recently prohibited all tissue samples from being sent to NAMRU-2, according to the CIDRAP article.1 The agreement between the U.S. and Indonesia that allowed NAMRU-2 to operate in Jakarta expired two years ago.2 According to Secretary Leavitt, while Supari “believes the sharing is illegal without an MOU [memorandum of understanding] and a material transfer agreement…[t]here is very little question that our lack of progress of getting that laboratory MOU…renewed is connected to” the virus-sharing issue.2,3 He also commented that Supari’s “action is obviously linked to her global initiative to seek specific benefits for sharing samples.”3 The CIDRAP article reported that negotiations on the virus-sharing issue will continue in advance of the WHO’s May 2008 World Health Assembly and that the WHO’s virus-sharing working group’s next formal meeting is in November.1 Additional comments by Secretary Leavitt about his recent Southeast Asia trip can be accessed on his blog. In response to Secretary Leavitt’s comments, the Associated Press reported that Widjaja Lukito, an adviser to Supari, denied that Indonesia is seeking financial compensation for its samples of H5N1 avian influenza virus and stated that the country “wants governments and pharmaceutical companies to come up with a mechanism that will ensure future pandemic vaccines are accessible to developing nations.”4 According to the Associated Press article, Lukito suggested that this could be accomplished through a “revolving fund developed by pharmaceutical companies” or a “multilateral trust funded by contributions from governments, influenza vaccine manufacturers and individuals to make sure vaccines are produced and distributed in a fair and equitable manner.”4 Indonesia announced its refusal to share H5N1 samples with the WHO in December 2006. As previously reported by the Biosecurity Briefing, Indonesia has maintained that position since 2006, save for two instances in which it sent samples to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is part of the WHO’s Flu network, for confirmatory testing.5 Talks hosted by the WHO in November 2007 failed to yield an agreement from Indonesia to resume sharing H5N1 virus samples because the WHO could not guarantee that it would provide a material transfer agreement specifying that the sample is used for diagnostic purposes and not for commercial gain.6 The WHO has stressed that having access to Indonesia’s virus samples is critical to the study of mutations that affect drug resistance and transmissibility.6 References
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