Gigi Kwik Gronvall, PhD Senior Associate Area of Professional Expertise: Immunology - Professional Profile - Selected Publications - Congressional Testimony and Briefings

  
In the News

2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 
  

2011

Anthrax labs are secure, Battelle says. Columbus Dispatch (OH). (10-27-2011). Dr. Gronvall is quoted in this article.

Possible select agent reshuffle adheres to biosecurity panel. Global Security Newswire. (10-06-2011): Dr. Gronvall is quoted in this article.

FYI: what is the most dangerous piece of laboratory equipment? Popular Science. (07-28-2011): Dr. Gronvall comments about the dangers of working in a lab, “the most dangerous thing is human error, and the highest containment labs are much less likely to have it."

Experts say pathogens easy to acquire, use as WMD, by Anthony Kimery. Homeland Security Today. (03-11-2011). The article "Everywhere you look, select agent pathogens," written by Kunal Rambhia, Abigail Ribner, and Gigi Gronvall, is referenced in this article.

First U.S. cowpox infection: acquired from lab contamination, by Sara Reardon. Science. (02-17-2011): Dr. Gronvall discusses implications of a recent lab accident as “…one more example of many examples that speaks to the need for more vigilance” in lab research.

  
2010

Why Senator Lugar is worried about terrorism in East Africa, by Mike Pflanz. Christian Science Monitor. (11-12-2010): Dr. Gronvall comments on biological weapons production: “It is a lower-tech option than making a nuclear weapon, sure, but it’s not as simple as stealing it and then infecting yourself. To then infect others, you would have to know a little bit about what you are doing.”

Synthetic pathogens might pose bioterror threat, scientists warn, by Rachel Oswald. Global Security Newswire. (09-10-2010): Dr. Gronvall discusses government regulation of synthetic biology and the need for a robust response capability in the event of an epidemic , "You don’t want to put every egg in one basket but where I think the majority of eggs should be is the ability to respond to diseases whether they are accidental, natural or deliberate."

Committee recommends a sequence-based system for identifying pathogens, by Meredith Wadman. Nature. (08-03-2010): Dr. Gronvall comments about a National Academies proposal to classify pathogens by genetic sequence: "It would actually decrease regulatory clarity."

Report urges genetic IDs for bioterror germs, by Steve Sternberg. USA Today. (08-03-2010): Dr. Gronvall notes that classifying select agents by their gene sequences as well as by their scientific names would "put the onus on DNA synthesis companies to follow up if someone orders a sequence that might be dangerous."

Documents show vast cleanup of Plum Island land, Associated Press/ABC News. (06-26-2010): With regard to pathogenic research on Plum Island, Dr. Gronvall comments: “I'd say it's extremely unlikely that any pathogens could have been released.”

Biosecurity struggles between safe and secure, Science and National Security. Host: Randy Larsen. Federal News Radio. (06-14-2010): Dr. Gronvall discusses safety and security of laboratories. 

Growing public interest in genetic science sparks some bio-security concerns, by Stew Magnuson. National Defense Magazine. (05-17-2010): Dr. Gronvall comments about do-it-yourself biology, “I would take a wait-and-see approach to DIY-bio. There are many more positive aspects to it than negative.”

  
2009

Immunity challenge: Let Americans have the smallpox and anthrax vaccines, by Deroy Murdock. National Review Online. (12-03-2009): Dr. Gronvall discussed immunizing healthcare workers against bioterrorism agents: “People who are immune could help respond, since they would not need to worry about getting infected. That is part of the reason why priority groups include health-care workers. They would be in contact with the infected, and their services would be needed.”

Vaccine video uses humor to ask a serious question, by Steve Sternberg. USA Today. (11-04-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about shortages of H1N1 vaccine and the realities of flu vaccine technology: “We couldn't get a vaccine out for any other disease as quickly as flu."

Biological weapons convention must be fixed, experts say, by Martin Matishak. Global Security Newswire. (10-08-2009): Dr. Gronvall’s October 6, 2009, presentation at the Center's conference titled "Prevention of Biothreats: A Look Ahead" is cited.

New legislation would make U.S. leader on biosecurity, Lieberman says, by Martin Matishak. Global Security Newswire. (09-09-2009): Dr. Gronvall weighs in on security at biological research facilities and the need to pare down the select agent list: "While every select agent is dangerous, they are not all equal and it's becoming conventional wisdom that either a stratification or a reduction of the select agent list is needed so that resources can be concentrated on where they need to be."

Pandemic paralysis: H1N1 influenza underscores barriers to timely research. Emergency Medicine Reports. (08-01-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about the IRB process and its impact on social science research "Researchers need to be able to conduct interviews of patients and caregivers to evaluation the response, to be able to ask people about control strategies that have worked for them . . . So you can actually engage in research, bring your expertise to bear and maybe show that research to people who can make decisions based on it so that it has a chance of being relevant."

Thousands of uncounted disease samples found at army biodefense lab, by Martin Matishak. Global Security Newswire. (06-18-2009): Dr. Gronvall weighs in on the discovery at USAMRIID of more than 9,000 undocumented samples during a lab inventory: “It’s not a security risk, but an organizational problem.”

Money, vaccines and lots of soap, by Alex Lash. The Deal. (05-01-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about the federal investments needed in cell-based vaccine technology for developing flu vaccine more rapidly than the currently used egg-based technology allows, "They've pushed eggs as far as they can go."

Swine H1N1 influenza vaccine could reduce supply of seasonal flu vaccine, by Robert Lowes. MedScape. (05-01-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about 2009 H1N1 influenza, “You don’t know what the swine flu will do” . . . “Biology is always full of surprises. The data changes from day to day, so you need to keep an eye on what’s going on and avoid both overreacting and underreacting. And you don’t want politics to influence these decisions.: "As of now, the federal government is on course to produce a H1N1 vaccine, but it could later nix the idea of mass production if the new virus fizzles out. Making the right decision will be tricky."

Homeland Security: Inside and Out, hosted by Dave McIntyre and Randy Larsen. Federal News Radio. (03-17-2009): Dr. Gronvall discusses the World At Risk Report and lab security: “…the fact is that pathogens are found everywhere…in hospitals, in research labs all over the world, in the soil. So you can’t really say you’re going to lock up this lab and get the security you’re looking for. You really need to examine the threat as a whole and make sure you’re prepared to deal with those pathogens no matter where they come from.” Listen to interview

Science Groups Counter WMD Panel's Prescription for Stemming Biological Threats, by Elaine M. Grossman. Global Security Newswire. (03-13-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about the recommendations in the World At Risk report to increase security in scientific laboratories:  "They got the overall gist of the threat right—that biological weapons are something we need to be concerned about and we need to be prepared for. …But to base all of our efforts to stop that from happening on locking up pathogens is … not going to work."

Winnowing Down the Bio Threats, by Adriel Bettelheim. CQ Today Online News. (03-12-2009): Dr. Gronvall discusses the select agent list and the clearance required for scientists who work with the pathogens on the list: “The [select agent] list is getting bigger … It doesn’t matter whether you work with one experiment, one agent or several. The security clearance is the same.”

Survey Gauges Dual-Use Attitudes, by Kirsten Dorans. Nature Medicine. (March 2009): Dr. Gronvall comments on the results of a National Research Council survey of scientists about dual-use research, and the revelation that about 15% of respondents noted that they had abandoned collaborations with scientific colleagues overseas: "In the larger sense of security, I don't think it's a good idea to break off collaborations."

Are fears over bioterrorism stifling scientific research?, by Peter Aldhous. New Scientist. (02-05-2009): Dr. Gronvall comments about scientific research, regulations, and a survey of biologists on their attitudes about conducting “dual-use” research: "I hope that one of the lessons taken from this survey is that many scientists are concerned about this issue and want to do something about it . . . Scientists should not be seen as the problem."

Homeland Security Inside and Out, Host: Randy Larsen. KAMU Radio, 90.9 FM. (01-20-2009): Rebroadcast of March 4, 2008, interview with Dr. Gronvall.

   
2008

How to fix biosecurity? The Scientist. (11-04-2008): Dr. Gronvall is quoted: "The GAO came up with this list of criteria and measured labs against it . . .And there's no analysis saying that those are the security characteristics a lab should have—that's kind of a problem."

BU outlines biolab safety steps: Scientists face in-depth screenings, by Stephen Smith. Boston Globe. (10-14-2008): With regard to security screenings of lab workers, Dr. Gronvall notes “It’s very hard to protect against an insider who’s one of the experts.”

After big win, PharmAthene focuses on bigger deal: Bidding on $500 million government contract for anthrax vaccine, by Katie Arcieri. Annapolis Capital. (10-05-2008): Dr. Gronvall weighs in on government efforts to fund recombinant protective antigen vaccines: “It’s a public health need in the event of an attack.”

Senators seek to boost U.S. biosafety, by Chris Schneidmiller. Global Security Newswire. (08-22-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments about the increasing numbers of scientists working in high containment biosafety labs and the need for standardized biosafety training: “When you had only a few people working in these areas, then they would train their people so that they could work safely in BSL-4,” . . . “Now that there are so many more scientists that are going to be working in these conditions, there needs to be a way to standardize that training so that you can conserve these mentors’ time and energy and bring everybody up to a certain level.”

Homeland Security Inside and Out. Host: Randy Larsen. KAMU Radio, 90.9 FM. (08-19-2008): In the wake of the case against Dr. Bruce Ivins as the prime suspect in the anthrax attacks of 2001, Dr. Gronvall weighs in on imposing restrictions on scientific research: "We can tell legitimate scientists [in the U.S.] they need to go through clearance to be able to work with anthrax. But we can't do anything about the many researchers all over the world who are working with anthrax and other people who can just readily access anthrax from the soil or other sources. It's a policy decision; we have to balance the risks and the rewards. We want countermeasures against anthrax—we need them—and in order to get them, you have to do research . . . " Listen to interview on Homeland Security Inside and Out website

FBI agrees to release more details from anthrax probe, backpeddles on key elements, by Andrew Tilghman. Talking Points Memo. (08-18-2008): Regarding the scientific evidence the FBI used to close case on the anthrax attacks of 2001, Dr. Gronvall comments “I expect people to be dazzled by the science. I am worried that people will confuse solid science (and I expect the science to be very good) with a solid case”… “The science will only take you so far.”

Labs that perform bioterrorism research proliferating, by Dave Altimari. Hartford Courant. (08-16-2008): Expressing concern about the thoroughness of background checks for lab workers, Dr. Gronvall notes that "Nobody is checking to see if people being approved to work with anthrax or other biological agents actually have the scientific skills to work with it."

Bioterrorism: Are we safe? Host: John Dankosky. Where We Live, WNPR (Connecticut). (08-12-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments on the FBI's conclusion of the investigation of the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the implications that has for the threat of anthrax: "Anthrax and bacteria that behave like anthrax are found all over the world, and people work on them for largely legitimate purposes. If weaponization of that bacteria is as easy as the FBI alleges that it was, then this is a big problem." Listen to interview on WNPR website

Scientists continue to question anthrax investigation and case against Bruce Ivins, by Andrew Tilghman. Talking Points Memo. (08-11-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments on the closing of the case against Dr. Bruce Ivins: "[federal officials] came out and said they'd made the case, but they didn't actually present that science. So it really can't be evaluated."

Anthrax case spurred field of germ-gene sleuthing, by Lauran Neergaard. Associated Press. (08-09-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments about using scientific data in criminal investigations: "Science is a wonderful thing but it is, at the end of the day, a tool"…"the question is how that [tool] was used."

Two experts—one in bioweapons and one in journalism—explore the numerous, still unanswered questions in the anthrax case, by Glenn Greenwald. Salon Radio: Anthrax Edition. (08-08-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments about the evidence in the Ivins case: “They [the FBI] didn't present anything so it's really hard to comment on it. You can develop a list of questions about it, but broadly, it's hard to poke holes at something that hasn't been offered.” Read transcript of interview on Salon.com website

Gaps in system kept Ivins at high-security lab, by Matt Apuzzo and Lara Jakes Jordan. Associated Press. (08-08-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments about the security at the Fort Detrick research facility: “USAMRIID is not like being in a shack in the wilderness. It's interacting with people in a pretty secure place.”

Dark portrait of Ivins, reported by Jeanne Meserve. The Situation Room, CNN. (08-07-2008): Dr. Gronvall noted that requiring more stringent rules for scientific research could make scientific research tougher: “There are lots of things that we need these scientists to do. We need them to do their job.”

Kennedy-Burr bill targets potential threats from within bio-research, by Matt Korade. Congressional Quarterly. (06-23-2008): Regarding the Kennedy-Burr legislation which promotes voluntary incident reporting, Dr. Gronvall commented, "This is a way to call attention to potential problems, so other researchers can learn for them and hopefully make the labs safer and more productive."

Biodefense: Senate bill would alter biosafety, select agent rules, by Jocelyn Kaiser. Science. (06-20-2008): Dr. Gronvall weighs in on the Select Agent Program and Biosafety Improvement Act of 2008: "It's very exciting. It has a lot of things that I completely agree with."

Boston University angers neighbors with Ebola, SARs germ lab, by Brian Sullivan. Bloomberg News. (06-05-2008): Dr. Gronvall was interviewed about the rise in the number of biosafety laboratories in the U.S.

Homeland Security Inside and Out. Host: Randy Larsen. KAMU 90.9 FM. (05-13-2008): Dr. Gronvall discussed vaccine research and biosecurity: "There [has] been a lot of concern about whether or not we can control legitimate research and [keep] it from getting into the hands of people who wish to do harm." Listen to interview on Homeland Security Inside and Out website

The profit of protection; Annapolis biodefense firm PharmAthene buys development rights for anthrax vaccine as part of $40 million deal, by Katie Arcieri. Annapolis (MD)  Capital. (05-11-2008): With regard to anthrax, Dr. Gronvall notes that "It's as much of a threat as it ever was.  It's important to continue preparing for it." 

Scientists call for biolab safety study, by Stephen Smith. Boston Globe. (05-03-2008): Dr. Gronvall comments about her participation on a National Research Council blue ribbon panel charged with reviewing the process for identifying suiable sites for building BSL4 research facilities: "the panel did not consider how long it would take to conduct the expanded review...and it was not part of our charge to do that."

Big bucks for biosecurity research - but who's doing what?, by Holly Menninger. States News Service. (05-01-2008): Regarding biosafety standards and federal oversight, Dr. Gronvall noted that "The time is ripe for something to be done . . . Biosafety failures have been more evident in the media, and this area has lots of eyes on it. If recommendations from the task force are reasonable, nothing should block action from being taken."

Homeland Security Inside and Out. Host: Randy Larsen. KAMU 90.9 FM. (03-04-2008): Radio interview with Dr. Gronvall. Dr. Gronvall notes that if she had a few minutes with the presidential candidates, the issues she would raise are (1) eliminating the threat of anthrax as a weapon of mass destruction, (2) continuing U.S. dominance in science, and (3) making a serious effort to combat infectious disease.

Biosafety: biodefense watchdog project folds, leaving a void, by Jocelyn Kaiser. Science. (02-15-2008): Dr. Gronvall is quoted regarding the end of the biosafety watchdog group, the Sunshine Project: "[Hammond] called attention to very real problems in the way that biosecurity has been funded and research reviewed . . . There's no one else I know of that will look over at that level of detail and keep things transparent."

   
2007

Experts ’fail’ risk analysis for Boston bioterror lab, by Rick Weiss. Washington Post. (11-30-2007): Noting the lack of scientific rigor of an NIH report about the risks associated with a proposed high-containment lab in Boston, expert panel member Dr. Gronvall remarks, “If the report were an article submitted to a scientific journal, we would have rejected this.”

NIH criticized for flawed review of biosafety lab, by Jocelyn Kaiser. ScienceNow Daily News. (11-29-2007): Noting the lack of scientific rigor of an NIH report about the risks associated with a proposed high-containment lab in Boston, expert panel member Dr. Gronvall comments that were this study submitted to a scientific journal, “we would have rejected this.”

Biosafety expert urges lawmakers to reform laboratory accident reporting guidelines. States News Service. (11-21-2007): Dr. Gronvall is quoted:  “The best way to create a safe research environment is to allow other scientists to learn about their colleagues’ mistakes before they repeat them.”

After accidents, laboratory safety is questioned, by Kelly Field. The Chronicle of Higher Education. (10-19-2007): Dr. Gronvall notes with regard to reporting lab accidents: "You want to encourage reporting, not punish people for reporting."

How safe are our bio-labs?, by Ken Stier. TIME. (10-05-2007): Report regarding Congressional hearing on high containment biological research labs mentions Dr. Gronvall.

Growth of biosafety labs not fully known, by Ruth Mantell. MarketWatch. (10-05-2007): Dr. Gronvall is quoted in a report about a Congressional briefing on biosafety labs: "Infections lead to negative publicity and scrutiny . . . adversely affecting future research funding."

Lack of training in biodefense research leading to dangerous leaks, most incidents go unreported, experts caution, by Cassandra Willyard. Nature. (08-31-2007): With regard to lab safety, Dr. Gronvall comments "I'm concerned that they're [lab workers] not being given the tools to protect themselves."

As biodefense research booms, reward is weighted against risk, by Pete Alfano. Fort Worth Star-Telegram. (08-23-2007): Dr. Gronvall is referenced in the article.

Biosafety labs urged to report accidents and near misses: U.S. think tank proposed mandatory but anonymous reporting, by John Miller. Nature. (04-04-2007): Dr. Gronvall is quoted: "The problem is that accidents aren't reported . . . People recognize the need, so let's do it."

UK pandemic test shows limits of off-site alternatives: Working from home doesn't replicate market activity, by John Sandman. Securities Industry News. (02-05-2007): Dr. Gronvall is quoted: "It is realistic to expect an avian flu vaccine, but not very soon."